Christian Schanes
Projektass. Dipl.-Ing. Dr.techn.
Christian Schanes
- Email: christian.schanes@tuwien.ac.at
- Phone: +43-1-58801-183411
- Office: (1040 Wien, Favoritenstrasse 11)
- About:
- Orcid:
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- Roles: PostDoc Researcher
Publications
Work in progress: Black-Box approach for testing quality of service in case of security incidents on the example of a SIP-based VoIP service.
Peter SteinbacherFlorian FankhauserChristian SchanesThomas GrechenigKeywords:
Astract: One of the main security ob jectives for systems connected
to the Internet which provide services like Voice over Inter-
net Protocol (VoIP) is to ensure robustness against security
attacks to fulfill Quality of Service (QoS). To avoid system
failures during attacks service providers have to integrate
countermeasures which have to be tested. This work evalu-
ates a test approach to determine the efficiency of counter-
measures to fulfill QoS for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
based VoIP systems even under attack. The main ob jective
of the approach is the evaluation of service availability of a
System Under Test (SUT) during security attacks, e.g., De-
nial of Service (DoS) attacks. Therefore, a simulated system
load based on QoS requirements is combined with different
security attacks. The observation of the system is based
on black-box testing. By monitoring quality metrics of SIP
transactions the behavior of the system is measurable. The
concept was realized as a prototype and was evaluated using
different VoIP systems. For this, multiple security attacks
are integrated to the testing scenarios. The outcome showed
that the concept provides sound test results, which reflect
the behavior of SIP systems availability under various at-
tacks. Thus, security problems can be found and QoS for
SIP-based VoIP communication under attack can be pre-
dicted.
Steinbacher, P., Fankhauser, F., Schanes, C., & Grechenig, T. (2010). Work in progress: Black-Box approach for testing quality of service in case of security incidents on the example of a SIP-based VoIP service. In Proceedings of IPTComm 2010 Principles, Systems and Applications of IP Telecommunications (pp. 107–116). Technische Universität München, Germany. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/53544
Mining security changes in freebsd
Andreas MauczkaChristian SchanesFlorian FankhauserMario BernhartThomas GrechenigKeywords:
Astract: Current research on historical project data is rarely
touching on the subject of security related information. Learning
how security is treated in projects and which parts of a software
are historically security relevant or prone to security changes can
enhance the security strategy of a software project. We present
a mining methodology for security related changes by modifying
an existing method of software repository analysis. We use the
gathered security changes to find out more about the nature
of security in the FreeBSD project and we try to establish a
link between the identified security changes and a tracker for
security issues (security advisories). We give insights how security
is presented in the FreeBSD project and show how the mined
data and known security problems are connected.
Mauczka, A., Schanes, C., Fankhauser, F., Bernhart, M., & Grechenig, T. (2010). Mining security changes in freebsd. In Proceedings of 7th IEEE Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories (MSR) (pp. 90–93). IEEE. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/53545
Problem space and special characteristics of security testing in live and operational environments of large systems exemplified by a nationwide IT infrastructure
Christian SchanesFlorian FankhauserThomas GrechenigMichael SchaffererKai BehningDieter HovemeyerKeywords:
Astract: The paper discusses foundations and requirements for testing security robustness aspects in operational environments while adhering to defined protection values for data. It defines the problem space and special characteristics of security testing in large IT infrastructures. In this area there are different environments with varying characteristics, e.g., regarding confidentiality of data. Common environments based on an existing IT project are defined. Testing in dedicated
test environments is state of the art, however, sometimes this is not sufficient and testing in operational environments is required. Case studies showed many restrictions in the security test process, e.g., limited access for testers, which have to be addressed. The problems of testing in these operational environments are pointed out. Experiences and some current solution approaches for testing these special environments are shown (e.g., usage of disaster/recovery mechanism).
Schanes, C., Fankhauser, F., Grechenig, T., Schafferer, M., Behning, K., & Hovemeyer, D. (2009). Problem space and special characteristics of security testing in live and operational environments of large systems exemplified by a nationwide IT infrastructure. In Advances in System Testing and Validation Lifecycle (pp. 161–166). IEEE. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/53068
Durchführungskonzept eines Penetrationstests anhand einer IT- Infrastruktur eines Unternehmens mit mobilen Clients
Christian SchanesFlorian FankhauserThomas GrechenigKeywords:
Astract: Die Abhängigkeit von IT-Systemen für Unternehmenszwecke nimmt laufend zu. Angriffe auf diese können die Anforderungen bezüglich Verfügbarkeit, Vertraulichkeit und Integrität der Daten stören und somit für das Unternehmen Verluste verursachen. Die Systeme müssen dabei derart abgesichert werden, dass der Aufwand für einen Angreifer höher ist als der entstehende Nutzen durch einen erfolgreichen Angriff.
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Penetrationstests, einer möglichen Testtechnik zur Überprüfung der Sicherheit von Infrastrukturen. Dabei führen Tester simulierte Angriffe durch, um vorhandene Schwachstellen im System zu ermitteln und die Ausnutzbarkeit darzustellen. Die Anwendung von Penetrationstests erfolgt beim laufenden System, wodurch auch Installations- und Konfigurationsfehler in der Betriebsumgebung ermittelt werden. Für eine umfangreiche Sicherheitsbetrachtung können Penetrationstests einen wichtigen Teil beitragen, um die Systeme abzusichern. Die Möglichkeiten und Limitierungen von Penetrationstests werden in dieser Arbeit anhand eines Anwendungsbeispiels dargestellt, indem ein Penetrationstestkonzept definiert wird. Dieses berücksichtigt erforderliche Testtechniken für die eingesetzten Technologien und diskutiert des Weiteren organisatorische Aspekte für die Durchführung.
Schanes, C. (2008). Durchführungskonzept eines Penetrationstests anhand einer IT- Infrastruktur eines Unternehmens mit mobilen Clients [Master Thesis, Technische Universität Wien]. reposiTUm. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12708/183793
Team
Business Informatics Group, TU Wien
Professors
Christian Huemer
Ao.Univ.Prof. Mag.rer.soc.oec.Dr.rer.soc.oec.
Dominik Bork
Associate Prof. Dipl.-Wirtsch.Inf.Univ.Dr.rer.pol.
Gerti Kappel
O.Univ.Prof.in Dipl.-Ing.inMag.a Dr.in techn.
Henderik Proper
Univ.Prof. PhDResearchers
Aleksandar Gavric
Univ.Ass. MEng. B.Eng.Galina Paskaleva
Projektass.in Dipl.-Ing.inDipl.-Ing.in BSc
Marianne Schnellmann
Univ.Ass.in BSc MScMarion Murzek
Senior Lecturer Mag.a rer.soc.oec.Dr.in rer.soc.oec.
Marion Scholz
Senior Lecturer Dipl.-Ing.inMag.a rer.soc.oec.